Reflections on the American Diplomacy Project
Reform, Yes! But Base It On Evidence: Reflections on The American Diplomacy Project II: Blueprints for a Modern U.S. Diplomatic Service.
By: Lindsey Michele and Dan Spokojny | November 7, 2022
When eight of the most experienced and accomplished diplomats alive write a report about how to revitalize the State Department, we must listen.
Within the beltway circles, there is palpable energy around rebuilding the U.S. Department of State to prepare it better to address today’s complex international challenges. Antony Blinken has made modernization a cornerstone of his tenure as Secretary of State, and supporters of diplomacy longing for new ideas with proven results.
Joining the chorus for reform is the American Diplomacy Project II: Blueprints for a More Modern U.S. Diplomatic Service (link to report). This is the second phase of the effort; it began with the 2020 report, A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.
One might lament that such an effort does not feature more prominently in this nation’s political discourse. Perhaps this is because the report was not intended to be a big vision for reform. From the start, the authors lowered expectations, explaining that they “focus on what we believe is most urgently needed and what it is possible to achieve in the near term.” The report’s authors know the State Department intimately, and the recommendations are realistic and pragmatic. Smartly, their proposals are all codified into legislation or executive language to increase the likelihood of implementation.
While there’s a lot to love about this report, there’s not much particularly new or surprising. Instead, it represents a coalescing and deepening of the recommendations for reform from a number of the most influential State Department-focused institutions, including the American Foreign Service Association, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation.
Given the depth and breadth of this report, in addition to the sterling reputation of the authors, this report will shape the debate on revitalizing the State Department for the rest of Secretary Blinken’s tenure.
Let’s first summarize what’s in the report, and next, we will reflect on what the authors may have overlooked.
Summarizing The Report’s Recommendations
The report’s central argument is, “To produce the best results for the American people, U.S. diplomatic efforts must be led by a professional, well-trained, and well-resourced service that can be partnered in some circumstances with non-career professionals.”
In other words, the authors imply that the disempowerment of careerists in favor of political appointees is weakening U.S. diplomacy. To fix this, they offer a range of solutions:
First, they call for the president to strengthen Chief of Mission authority such that everyone at the embassy must report to the ambassador. Politically, it will be a hard argument to convince the DoD and the rest of the interagency to submit their in-country representatives to the State Department’s rep, but they do their best.
They also suggest that State set a goal to “expand the percentage of ambassadorial positions held by career professionals and reduce the percentage of political appointee Ambassadors.”
Further, they call on State’s leadership to commit to having 75 percent of Assistant Secretary-level positions filled by career officials by 2025. They suggest at least two of the five Under Secretary positions at State be filled by career professionals, with one of the two being the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. They also want to ensure the job of Director General of the Foreign Service be held by an active service careerist.
Moreover, the authors believe State deserves more leadership at the National Security Council by suggesting State must chair all Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs).
The authors recommend enhancing the risk management authorities of Chiefs of Mission, including by changing the purpose and structure of the current Accountability Review Boards, which encourage zero-risk postures. They also endorse S.816, the Diplomatic Support and Security Act from Sen. Risch and Murphy, and its House companion, HR.6034, by Reps. Jacobs and Kinzer.
The report gives considerable attention to workforce issues.
They call for culture change to place greater value on professional education and training. They renew their call for “six months of residential training at each of four career milestones” from the entry to senior level for both the Foreign and Civil Service. They suggest new incentives for language training excellence.
They suggest making a professional development tour mandatory for entry into the Senior Foreign Service, perhaps by sending all FS-1s to study at a war college (about 500 each year). But they back off the idea of a 15% training float for the foreign service, suggesting 8% is sufficient.
To help incentivize training, they suggest that promotion boards give “significant weight” to reports about an officer’s effectiveness in training. Today, time in training is not seen as advancing one’s promotion prospects.
The authors recommend tweaking the promotion process by shifting class-wide competition for promotion into senior ranks.
The report calls for a global review of Foreign Service staffing patterns and rightsizing. As part of that effort, the authors suggest that tours of duty in dangerous locales should be restored to a standard of at least two years.
The authors join the conversation about the importance of the domestic roots of strong foreign policy by suggesting a new Engage America program, which would assign 500 Foreign Service members to provide annual engagement in all 50 states. The Engage American program would fulfill what they term an “urgent need” for diplomats to have more meaningful connections with the people they represent. This domestic outreach should be amplified, they suggest, by a more structured and vigorous approach to recruitment by hiring a professional firm to develop a public service campaign.
Finally, the most novel idea in the report is the call for the establishment of a Diplomatic Reserve Corps. The Corps would be a 1,000-member State Department ready reserve – a dedicated group of trained, on-call professionals available to respond quickly in the event of a crisis.
What the Report Missed
We support the call for an increased role for the U.S. State Department in foreign affairs – but that role should only be emphasized insofar as it strengthens U.S. foreign policy – not simply for the sake of regaining lost authority for career diplomats.
The biggest question raised by this report: How can the authors both recommend that FSOs assume more authority at State and NSC and that State Department training is woefully inadequate?
There is ample evidence that Congress and presidents have long-distrusted career diplomats (here, here, here, here, here, and here). One cannot simply wish that away. Without careful analysis of the weaknesses of the Foreign Service and the State Department, it is hard to know whether many of these suggestions will be seen as amounting to more than putting lipstick on a pig.
Second, what’s the evidence that these changes will work? fp21 welcomes their contribution to the discussion, and supports reform – but reform that works demands evidence-based solutions. For example, while the American Diplomacy Project II criticizes the Department which can “focus too heavily on ‘traditional’ diplomatic activities,” the report itself relies heavily on traditional research practices – such as interviews with diplomats, without the complement of modern research standards.
The interviews with stakeholders that informed this report offer a vital understanding of the challenges and opportunities. Yet, any serious reform agenda must be based on a more careful and holistic study of the problems and solutions to ensure the study seriously contends with long-held assumptions cultivated within the insular Foreign Service.
For instance, the section on the Diplomatic Reserve Corps missed what seemed like an obvious opportunity to engage with lessons learned from the failed surge capacity model from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Further, while the report referenced a RAND study on American views regarding the lack of diversity in the Foreign Service, that study does not provide evidence to support their proposed solutions despite a large body of literature on the subject.
In summation, there may be nobody on the planet with a better instinct for the challenges and opportunities to improve U.S. diplomacy than these authors. Yet gut instinct is insufficient. Our diplomats cannot face yet another ineffectual modernization effort.
We hope Congress will take this report seriously. But repeating calls for more authority, staff, and money may not achieve the desired results to elevate diplomacy to its rightful place within the U.S. national security infrastructure. Ultimately, we think the authors would agree: deeper study and a more holistic plan for reform will be necessary.